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Abstract 
 
Public enterprises have played a major role in the national development of Australia since the 
early years of European settlement. More recently, especially since the 1980s, Australian 
governments at national and state levels, involving political parties of both the left and right, have 
undertaken a program of major reform of their public sectors. The relentless pace of reform has 
been driven by a variety of motives from pragmatic through to ideological, within a broad 
consensus that private delivery of services should be privileged over public. As a result, discourse 
about public enterprises in Australia has tended to focus on divestment and windfall revenues to 
assist governments to balance their budgets. The analysis in this paper will detail the major 
players at the national level, their governance arrangements and some consideration of how these 
enterprises have performed. We will also outline how the public mission of public enterprises has 
transformed in recent decades from a role as nation builder to one as enabler of services. In 
conclusion we will consider the long-term outlook including the loss of public value with 
declining standards of service and the reduced opportunities for further divestments with pressure 
on governments to seek alternative savings and revenue arrangements. 
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Introduction 
 
Institutional factors and both ideological and pragmatic politics have influenced the 
development and nature of public enterprises at national level in Australia. Constitutional 
arrangements have partly determined areas of activity pursued by public enterprises at both the 
Commonwealth 2  and state levels. Development patterns, the “tyranny of distance”, natural 
resources, scarcity of private investment funds and market failures, have all contributed to the 
character and structure of these enterprises. Banking, energy, transport, telecommunications, 
health, superannuation and insurance have all experienced a wide range of public and private 
arrangements within the market based economy. As a result of its recent history, Australian 
political culture now supports a lesser degree of government participation in the market with 
specific attention to advance universal service delivery obligations. An ongoing engagement with 
debates on privatisation since the 1980s, by political parties of the right and left, continues to re-
shape government activity across established and emerging activities. The primary shift over the 
past fifty or so years has been a transition from public enterprise as an “engine room” for national 
development to one where those enterprises which have remained in public ownership provide 
useful cash flows to government as they are typically expected to operate on a commercial basis. 
 
Australian governments have traditionally played a significant role as an owner, funder and 
provider of services to the public. Since European settlement in 1788, Australians have had a 
heavy reliance on government, and governments of all persuasions have been attracted to the 
notion of a strong state tradition (Wettenhall, 2006). This culminated in what Kelly (1992) 
referred to as the “Australian Settlement”, a social compact which promoted development based 
on white immigration, industry protection, and a social protection system based on wages being 
centrally determined via arbitration and conciliation. As Keating (2004) argued, Australians have                                                         
1 This reference is to the nursery rhyme,  
‘Old Mother Hubbard went to the cupboard 
to get her poor dog a bone,  
when she got there, the cupboard was bare, 
and the poor dog had none’. 
2 In this paper the national (or federal) government is referred to as “the Commonwealth”. 
 long looked to government for answers, welfare and security. Indeed in the 1930s it was noted that 
“Australian democracy has come to look upon the State as a vast public utility” (Hancock, 1945, 
p. 2) with its long history of using public enterprise to achieve social and policy goals. By the late 
twentieth century, Australian governments operated enterprises across a range of industries, both 
competitive (for example, insurance, banking) and monopolistic (for example, electricity, airports, 
telecommunications). The combined value of these activities comprised about 9.8% of the 
nation’s GDP (Marsden, 1998). 
 
This affinity with public enterprise has, however, changed as divestment activity has 
accelerated over the past three decades, especially in relation to public enterprises. In a general 
trend away from the public state towards the private state, Australia has joined many other 
countries in the world in adopting privatisation practices. Indeed, it has emerged as a notable 
reformer, impressive in both the scale and scope of its privatisation. This has been especially the 
case across three key areas — divestment of public enterprises, outsourcing of the delivery of 
public services, and increases in cost recovery by government agencies. Publicly-owned economic 
enterprises like banks, airlines, telecoms, postal services, seaports, and airports have all been 
divested, with the proceeds from sales being used primarily to reduce government debt. While 
some traditional public enterprises remain, the contemporary focus of government activity tends to 
be on the regulatory oversight of public enterprises, and their facilitation and advisory functions, 
rather than on their ownership arrangements. Indeed, there are now so few public enterprises 
remaining under government ownership that more recent attempts at divestment have led some 
commentators to the view that “the cupboard is bare”; that future divestments would need to be 
accelerated at state government level, with the Commonwealth role focused on offering 
inducements to those states which divest their enterprises (Coorey, 2013). While there has been 
considerable privatising activity at state government level, this paper will focus on public 
enterprises within the Commonwealth government’s remit.  
 
 
Public Enterprise Policy 
 
The evidence presented in the Australian case is one of broad agreement on public enterprise 
policy transformation from public enterprise with a role in national development towards a more 
complex role in facilitation, contracting and regulation of the economy. However, the trajectories 
taken by the major political parties underline significant differences between them, especially with 
regard to their motives for divesting public enterprises. Labor was concerned that enterprises 
would only be divested if they operated in competitive environments and that community service 
obligations could be retained. By contrast, the conservative parties adopted a policy based on 
primacy of private over public ownership. 
 
In 1982, the Australian Labor Party (Labor) endorsed the traditional importance of public 
ownership in committing the Party to the "establishment and development of public enterprises, 
based upon federal, state and other forms of social ownership, in appropriate sectors of the 
economy" (ALP, 1982). However, by 1986 this policy was more pragmatic in its implementation, 
with the Minister for Finance, Senator Peter Walsh arguing that “if its cheaper to put the control of 
operations of public enterprises into private hands, then I'd like to do it that way.” Walsh went on 
to suggest that he had no particular ideological preference for public or private ownership, "I 
simply say to the Leader of the Opposition that, unlike the Opposition, my Government is not a 
captive of any privatisation ideology” (Walsh, 1986).  
 
While assuming indifference to ownership, public or private, Labor was particularly concerned 
about competition as a driver of change to modernise a broad range of functions and services in 
government. It sought to expose public enterprises to competition and, where a sector was highly 
competitive, it divested government involvement. In bringing to an end Australia’s longstanding 
preference for public enterprise in areas such as banking, airlines, public utilities and 
telecommunications, Labor adopted a pragmatic and tactical policy (Feigenbaum and Henig, 
1994) in determining which enterprises would be privatised: enterprises in monopoly markets 
such as airports, or those which had significant community service obligations such as Australia 
 Post and Telecom, remained in government ownership, while public enterprises in competitive 
markets such as banking (the Commonwealth Bank) and airlines (Qantas) were divested. 
Ownership, public or private, was not the primary goal of Labor’s divestment policies; rather it 
was the need to ensure high performance in competitive environments, as well as protecting the 
public interest involved (Aulich and O’Flynn, 2007). Having satisfied Labor’s tests, these 
enterprise sales were aimed at reducing the budget deficit, addressing the growing debt problem, 
funding popular government programs, and providing an avenue to escape future funding of 
capital expenditure (Beckett, 1992). It has been estimated that divestment during the 1980s 
yielded around $6.7b3 for the government coffers (Aulich and O’Flynn, 2007).  
 
Even after Labor’s tranche of divestments, Commonwealth public enterprises continued to 
contribute significantly to the Australian economy. Public enterprises generated nearly $21b in 
revenue, provided dividends to the government of $1.6b, controlled assets of approximately $41b, 
produced an average return on assets of 12.8 per cent and comprised 7% of GDP, 9% of 
employment and 14% of gross fixed capital expenditure (ANAO, 1997, p. ix; Abbott and Cohen, 
2014). 
 
By contrast with Labor, the Liberal-National Coalition parties adopted a more ideological 
position, declaring that the private sector was intrinsically better able to deliver the services of the 
public enterprises more efficiently and effectively and sought to downsize the public sector by 
divesting many public enterprises. Prime Minister Howard (1981; 1995) had earlier argued that 
individuals rather than government were inherently better at making decisions about their future, 
and he was “profoundly suspicious” of what governments could achieve, arguing that 
“governments control, while the private sector provides enterprise”. This policy position was not 
surprising given that in the 1980s, the Coalition had developed a privatisation “hit list” which 
included a wide range of public enterprises (LNP, 1988).  
 
The election of the Liberal-National Coalition government in 1996 brought with it a different 
strategy, which is best seen as systemic or political (Feigenbaum and Henig, 1994). Consistent 
with these views, the Howard government accelerated the pace and scope of privatisation, 
especially through divestment of public enterprises. The core principle of the Howard 
government’s approach was captured in a speech by the Minister responsible for the public sector. 
In this speech, he argued that the government took a “Yellow Pages” approach to public enterprise 
– if such services existed in the Yellow Pages telephone directory there was no reason why they 
should be provided by government (Kemp, 1997). The Howard government accrued $61 billion 
from divestment of public enterprises between 1996 and 2008 (di Marco, Pirie and Au-Yeung, 
2009) with a further 5.68b raised from the divestment by the Abbott government of the 
government health insurance agency, Medibank Private (Mayne, 2015). 
 
During this period, Australia undertook the largest disposal of assets in its history (see Table 
1). Asset sales also included commercial entities operating within government departments, 
though not officially designated as public enterprises. In its first budget the government 
announced that it would divest itself of these services such as property maintenance and car fleet 
management.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
In the period immediately following the 1996 election the prime driver of the mergers and 
acquisitions market was the divestment of public enterprises (J P Morgan, 1998). Divestments 
included a wide range of enterprises such as the national shipping line ($20.7m), Australian 
Defence Industries ($346.8m) and the first tranche of the sale of the national telecommunication 
company, Telstra ($16b). Telstra represented the most significant of these divestments given its                                                         3 In this paper, all figures are in AUD. 
 iconic status in Australia, the political controversy surrounding the sale and its sheer size. The sale 
of Telstra was marketed as a way for “mums and dads” to become shareholders, thus helping the 
government to create a “capital-owning democracy” and turning Australia into one of the world’s 
leading shareholding nations (ASA, 2000, p. 19). Proceeds from the Telstra sales were directed in 
different ways, with some earmarked for specific programs or policy areas ($1.5b for 
environmental programs, $671m for a “social bonus”, $2 billion for improvements in rural areas) 
as part of the political deals made at the time (Fahey, 1998). Significant returns from the Howard 
government privatisation program were applied to debt reduction – so much that in 2006 the 
Treasurer announced that the Australian government was “debt-free” having paid off $96 billion 
in just over a decade (The Australian, 2006).    
The total revenues realised from asset sales by the Commonwealth governments in the period 
from 1983 to 2013 was approximately 70.5b (or $194b) in constant dollar terms. By 2011-12, 
public enterprise comprised 1.3% of GDP and there had been a decline to 1.8% of gross fixed 
capital expenditure (Abbott and Cohen, 2014).   
In the past decade, however, the Australian divestment program has slowed considerably. This 
probably has more to do with the low numbers of public enterprises remaining for sale (“the 
cupboard was bare”), rather than a fundamental change in government approach, especially when 
conservative Coalition parties were in government. At one stage it appeared that the Howard 
government was adopting a more pragmatic approach to divestment with its abandonment of the 
sale of the iconic Snowy-Hydroelectric scheme and Medibank Private, the government-owned 
private health fund, after considerable public disquiet. However, the incoming Abbott government 
divested Medibank almost as soon as elected in 2013 and moved to accelerate further divestments 
at Commonwealth government level. The Abbott government also offered inducements to state 
governments to follow suit under a $5b program called “Asset Recycling” that aimed to fast-track 
the construction of productivity-boosting infrastructure projects, on condition that state 
governments agree to privatise assets, especially in the energy, water and transport sectors 
(Australian Government, 2014). At the time of writing, there was little evidence available to gauge 
how effective these inducements have been. Importantly, there were no major divestments of 
public enterprises at national level under Labor governments from 2007-13. 
Despite the re-emergence of divestment as a major policy of the current Coalition government, 
there are few public enterprises remaining at national level, and those that are slated for sale are 
unlikely to yield the level of revenues that were generated in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century (see Table 2). Indeed, it appears that many of the current public enterprises may become 
hybrid organisations, government-owned but expected to make commercial returns from some or 
all of their activities. For example, it has been predicted that the state broadcaster, the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission (ABC), may be required to introduce commercials to defray costs; and 
that the telecommunications carrier, National Broadband Network (NBN) might require users to 
self-fund the final link in the network from the public nodes to their dwellings. Australia Post is 
also under consideration for an overhaul, with privatisation strategies being discussed for more of 
its operations. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Governance Arrangements for Public Enterprises 
 
In Australia the myriad of legal structures characteristic of a federal system has implications 
for consistency in the types of governance frameworks implemented for public enterprises. 
Differing funding and reporting obligations produced by various legislative instruments, policy 
settings or contractual arrangements applied to governance of public enterprises, typically lead to 
inconsistencies or problems in the resulting governance arrangements. Governance arrangements 
in public enterprises have been a source of dramatic changes for at least two decades largely based 
on management philosophies focused on performance and accountability (Ryan and Ng, 2000; 
JCPAA, 2002; CSA, 2013). Current debate in Australia reflects international concern about 
promoting improved governance in the broader public sector. Debate on public enterprises tends 
 to focus on institutional arrangements and on the roles and powers of their Boards.  
 
Public enterprises established by the Commonwealth government since the 1990s fall under 
the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997. Areas of activity include: the Murray 
Darling Basin Authority, with its focus on water distribution and environmental protection; the 
Clean Energy Finance Corporation to promote entrepreneurial activity in developing new sources 
of energy; and the Future Fund for the management of sovereign wealth funds, which was seed-
funded by applying revenues from the sale of Telstra. The most contentious project undertaken by 
the federal government in the last decade is the National Broadband Network (NBN) as 
“Australia’s largest publicly owned infrastructure project since the 1950s” (JCNBN, 2012). 
Controversially, the NBN was established by the federal Labor government as a monopoly in the 
delivery of fibre-optic broadband services across the country. In recognition of the mixed 
performance of public agencies including public enterprises, the Public Governance, Performance 
and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA) was established by the then federal Labor government to 
ensure high standards of governance, accountability and performance across all Commonwealth 
entities including companies4. This focus on performance management is consistent with broader 
control over the performance of all government departments, agencies and entities. 
 
Governance arrangements are typically established to ensure the enterprise can operate 
independently from government. The government appoints a board of Directors, whose role is 
ostensibly independent, to set the strategic direction for the enterprise, identify and manage risk, 
ensure compliance with the relevant legislation, and appoint the chief executive. Some boards also 
make decisions on marketing programmes and set contract and remuneration conditions for the 
senior managers. Boards appointed by the Commonwealth government, in contrast to many 
international counterparts, have a higher degree of autonomy especially in terms of strategic 
policy and personnel management. However, Australian boards are less free in terms of financial 
management and operations-level policy (Aulich et al., 2010). In Australia, directors are required 
to declare their pecuniary interests in relation to matters being considered by their board.  
 
Section 109 of the Australian Constitution states that if the Commonwealth Parliament and a 
state parliament pass conflicting laws on the same subject, then the Commonwealth law overrides 
the state law, or the part of the state law that is inconsistent with it. The Commonwealth 
government also has a general power over Corporations Law. However, both Commonwealth and 
state level enterprises are typically established under specific enabling legislation, for example 
Commonwealth government’s managers of sovereign wealth funds are established through the 
Future Fund Act 2006. There has been a trend in recent years for governments to establish public 
enterprises under specific statutes. A survey of Benchmarking Governance Practice in 
Commercialised Government Entities conducted in 2009, revealed that more than half of 
Commonwealth government-owned corporations are established under statute, more than one-
third operate under the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997, and less than one-
third operate under the Corporations Act 2000. Such patterns raised concerns within the policy 
community that this mixture produces uncertainty about differing funding and reporting 
obligations. Boards have raised concerns about increased costs as they need to seek professional 
advice on key governance issues like reporting, audit and accountability requirements. The 
passing of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 has removed many 
of these discrepancies. 
 
There has often been poor governance and management when Board and management 
appointments are used as forms of political patronage (McAuley, 2014). The appointment of 
former politicians as members of boards is common practice at both the state and federal level – 
for example a former federal Treasurer was appointed as the Chair of the FutureFund.  
                                                         4 Federal arrangements allow state governments some flexibility to adopt their own distinctive approaches and 
priorities. These include the provision of energy, water supply, rail networks, seaports, workers compensation, 
regional development corporations, public transport, and health services (see Colley and Head, 2013).   
 Recent debate in the policy community has encouraged a shift away from rules-based 
approaches to principles-based reporting by public enterprise boards, more consistently with the 
approaches of private sector boards (CSA, 2013; JCPAA, 2013). A principles-based approach is 
seen to provide insight into the decision-making of boards and allows boards to determine how 
they will meet the spirit of the principles. Governments appear to be convinced the success of an 
entity can be evaluated primarily by reference to its financial performance and position. Therefore, 
the provision of audited quantitative and qualitative performance information about the services 
provided is critical. A shift to principle based reporting has implications for the ability of 
governments to determine return on investment and broaden the expectation of boards to consider 
community service obligations in their decision-making. These issues were debated in the 
Commonwealth Parliament during the introduction of the PGPA 2013, which in many ways 
encouraged greater uniformity across both levels of the federal system (JCPAA, 2013).  
 
Public Mission 
 
Australian public enterprises have both commercial and non-commercial missions. These 
enterprises are expected to exhibit both productive and allocative efficiency. Community service 
obligations (CSO) tend to reflect the non-commercial activities undertaken by government trading 
enterprises at the direction of the government to achieve social policy objectives and public 
outcomes (PC, 2008). Governments have largely adopted a common view of CSOs as activities 
these enterprises would not choose to do on a commercial basis and which other businesses, either 
public or private, are not required by law to undertake (PC, 2008). The level of government and 
the sector in which the enterprise operates influences these objectives. As an example, the 
Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) contributes “social value to the communities in 
which it operates” (ABC, 2014, p. 104). It does this through activities such as emergency 
broadcasting, community service announcements that support Australian communities, providing 
access to broadcasting by those living in more remote communities, and contributing to the 
development of media organisations in the Asia-Pacific region. For most enterprises the economic 
and financial objectives take precedence and public good or public interest outcomes remain broad 
and vague. Other enterprises have purely commercial objectives and make no pretence of 
commitments to social obligations.  
 
There has been some debate over the appropriate identification of CSOs in the reporting and 
governance requirements of public enterprises. The Productivity Commission, a government 
entity, argues that mandatory identification of CSOs and the transparent reporting of costing and 
funding methods help to “promote good governance but also reduces incentives to underfund 
CSOs” (PC, 2008, p. 41). While transparency has been emphasised in relevant policy documents 
by each jurisdiction, most enterprises do not disclose details of how CSOs are costed or 
arrangements relating to the payment of the CSO by government (PC, 2008, p. 46). The concern 
here is that inadequate compensation for CSOs can affect the financial performance of the 
enterprise, which in turn has the potential to impair commercial viability. “Underfunding a CSO 
could result in under-investment or higher prices for commercial services and the reduction of 
service quality” (PC, 2008, p. 39).  
 
Aulich (2011) argues that over the past two decades the privatisation agenda in Australia has 
shifted the traditional reliance on government institutions to meet people’s needs to one where 
private and individual institutions have assumed a significant role in the delivery of public 
services. While improvements to service typically receive scant attention following privatisation, 
there is growing concern that in some cases the public missions of these privatised enterprises 
have been sacrificed with the transfer of ownership. For example, the claims that Australia’s 
airports are able to generate efficiencies and improved performance that government owners 
cannot is a difficult argument to sustain, especially in light of the performance of Sydney airport. 
In Sydney’s case, weak financial results are taking place against a background of increasing traffic 
volume indicators that should make it easier for the airport to generate profits than its predecessor 
public enterprise, the Federal Airports Corporation (Aulich, 2015). In the case of airports, at the 
time of divestment the government removed some of the regulatory controls that had applied to 
airport ownership and operations, by passing the Airports Amendment Bill 2002. The then 
 Minister for Regional Services, Territories and Local Government argued that this bill would 
remove unnecessary restrictions on the operation of general aviation airports and increase the 
scope for investment in airport operator companies (Tuckey, 2002).  
 
The Productivity Commission has recognised that the largest airports do possess significant 
market power but concluded that aeronautical charges do not point to the inappropriate exercise of 
that market power (PC, 2012). The Commission commented favourably on the increased levels of 
investment in aeronautical infrastructure since privatisation, and that airports have not experienced 
the bottlenecks that have beset other infrastructure areas (PC, 2012). This is consistent with the 
expectations expressed by the Coalition government in terms of using market mechanisms to 
generate further private investment in infrastructure generally, and airports in particular. It does 
raise the issue of whether or not the government would have been prepared to invest as heavily in 
airports or whether the government owners would have been able or willing to make as much 
economic use of the limited land at airports as have the private owners. 
 
However, this analysis of the effectiveness of airport performance under private ownership 
raises considerable skepticism regarding blanket claims that the private sector is much more 
effective than the public sector at liberating wealth from infrastructure assets. The former Prime 
Minister, John Howard, promoted the view that “there are good economic reasons for those 
airports to be operated by private industry” and that “the experience all around the world has been 
that privatised airports get run better” (Howard, 2002). In light of recent performance, it is 
difficult to justify a view that governments should always prefer private sector organisations to 
deliver public services and that the option of a government business entity might also be 
considered against private ownership. Nevertheless, persistent claims remain of abuse of market 
power in relation to non-aeronautical services, such as parking, as do concerns about the overall 
level of service delivery, especially aeronautical services. 
 
Maintenance of public value is a prime concern with any divestment of public assets. This 
might include the transfers across time considering that future revenue streams will now accrue to 
the private sector from the sale of the public asset. Further, governments have traditionally had a 
difficult time understanding and forecasting the true value of their assets, given complex and 
uncertain future population, economic growth, travel patterns, and cash flows. Selling a public 
asset below its true value may capture definite windfalls in the near term, but may be a regrettable 
decision over the longer run.  
 
The private sector should not be presumed to act in the public interest; clearly their primary 
accountability is to their shareholders. This means that governments are primarily responsible to 
ensure that the public interest is considered when determining any given asset divestment (or in 
the case of other forms of privatisation). The need to factor in “publicness” (Aulich, 2011) has not 
always been accepted by recent conservative governments in Australia and there have been cases 
where public assets have been divested and the public has either not been sufficiently well 
compensated from the sale or sufficiently protected after the sale where weak regulatory 
arrangements have been adopted. It appears that this problem has emerged more often in relation 
to the divestment of public monopolies, such as the Australian Wheat Board (see, for example, 
Botterill, 2012) and the airports (see above discussion). This contrasts markedly with the post-
privatisation protections offered in other industries that were privatised in Australia, particularly 
those operating in contestable environments such as banking, insurance or airlines where the 
government liberalised entry arrangements to enable international providers to compete with the 
former government-owned enterprises. 
 
Several important governance dimensions arise from this discussion. First, Australian 
governments have shifted their primary roles with respect to public enterprises from one as direct 
owner and provider of services to one of regulator. Specific agencies have been created or 
strengthened to undertake this role change. Second, governments of all political persuasions have 
been diligent is establishing stronger performance monitoring regimes. The regulatory regimes 
established have been important in enhancing the accountability of the new private sector 
 “owners” in many sectors, for example, banking and airports. The on-going annual monitoring 
conducted by government bodies such as the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC), has proven significant in keeping a focus on performance standards and alerting the 
public and government to areas and functions where performance standards have been 
problematic. The full evaluation of airport service quality conducted by the Productivity 
Commission can be directly related to the public reporting of lower standards by the ACCC.  
 
Public Discourse 
 
In Australia political pragmatism moderates ideological preferences that shape the public 
discourse surrounding public enterprises. The political agenda has largely focused on enterprises 
that can be considered candidates for sale through some form of privatisation process, for example 
sale or, to a limited extent, lease arrangements. In recent years the federal government has been a 
major influence on the political agenda for reform of the public sector. In the context of ongoing 
austerity measures driven by expanding budget deficits, the Commonwealth government has been 
focused on selling specific assets and providing incentives to state governments to do likewise. In 
a report from the National Commission of Audit (NCOA), established in 2013, it was argued that 
there was $13 billion of equity tied up in Commonwealth government commercial or semi 
commercial business enterprises. According to the NCOA it was the responsibility of governments 
to consider the privatisation potential of these assets: “The starting point of any programme would 
be those bodies, such as government business enterprises, that operate commercially and are ready 
for sale. Other bodies with potential for sale may first need to be put on a more commercial 
footing” (NCOA, 2014, p. 221). The NCOA encouraged the government to undertake scoping 
studies that would consider the “objectives for a sale, including: any community service 
obligations; regulatory or legislative requirements; actions required to prepare the business for 
sale; the industry in which the entity operates; and preferred method of sale” (NCOA, 2014, p. 
221).  
 
The Commonwealth government has offered state governments incentives to examine 
divestment potential of public enterprises. In the past, decisions to divest have been influenced by 
both pragmatic and systemic factors. Since the early 1990s arguments based on discontent with 
the performance of some state enterprises in driving economic efficiency have provided a support 
base for privatisation. The contemporary public discourse of budget crisis has re-framed the 
privatisation agenda as a “budget repair” and enhanced project delivery initiative. Since 2013 the 
Commonwealth government’s Asset Recycling Initiative (ARI) provided state governments 
incentives to privatise public enterprises and utilise most of the funds for new infrastructure 
projects. Infrastructure Australia recently identified $139 billion in unsold national and state assets 
including ports, airports, freight, electricity and water assets that could be sold. The CEO of 
Infrastructure Partnerships Australia lauded the ARI as “a welcome, prudent and sensible policy 
that removes a major disincentive for state governments in recycling old assets to fund new 
projects” (Coorey 2013). This general approval of the asset recycling program leaves less room 
for more pragmatic approaches to privatising public enterprises on a case-by-case basis and 
applies financial incentives for states to privatise, irrespective of local or special considerations. 
 
However, in appealing to their local constituencies the state Premiers have been careful to 
emphasise that, as attractive as privatisation may appear, they would need to present such 
divestment proposals to voters before any privatisation decisions were made (Coorey, 2013). 
What is largely hidden in the public debate, however, is the actual contribution of public 
enterprises to the fiscal position of each jurisdiction. Recent research has revealed that without 
state-owned electricity revenues, all other things being equal, the NSW Coalition government 
would have struggled to avoid deficits in every budget since its election in 2011 (Walker, 2015). 
While such evidence supports arguments for the long-term economic contribution of some public 
enterprises it tends to be ignored by governments pursuing a privatisation agenda. Some suggest 
that, despite the rhetoric of consultation and electoral mandates, state governments practice a form 
of “strategic misrepresentation” (Jones and Euske, 1991) through opaque accounting methods and 
data problems that limit analysis and benchmarking required for establishing the arguments for 
and against privatisation (Chester, 2015; PC, 2008; Walker, 2015).  
  
Conclusions 
Three decades of divestment of public enterprises represent a change in the nature of 
government in Australia, or at least how it chooses to go about delivering its programs to the 
public. After a long history of public enterprise, Wettenhall (2006, p. 36) observed that “public 
enterprise, social welfare and arbitral state images no longer tell us much about the ongoing 
Australian system”. Following decades of bipartisan support for public enterprise as a critical 
institution of nation building, Australia has essentially changed its mind. The motivations for this 
shift are multiple and entangled. Certainly there has been a sharp break from a pragmatic use of 
public enterprise to meet the socio-economic needs of Australians towards a more ideological 
program of divestment, but we suggest that the Australian story has involved a more complex mix 
of privatisation strategies.  
Public enterprises in both national and state jurisdictions have been reduced in number over the 
past three decades, consistent with the small government focus of most governments, both 
conservative and progressive. Privatisation has provided significant budgetary relief for many 
governments, which in turn may have influenced decisions to privatise in marginal cases. The 
remaining public enterprises are typically those with important public missions, as governments 
have been unable or unwilling to find ways of measuring and accommodating the community 
service obligations of these bodies. For example, Australia Post has a statutory obligation to 
provide a universal postal rate for regular mail, in which less expensive services in cities cross-
subsidise the more expensive services in remote communities.  
 
What is most important is the change in the role of government from one primarily concerned 
with direct provision of services to a role focused on regulation of services, or one of enabling 
services to be provided by third parties from the private and not-for-profit sectors. Even where 
public enterprises remain, many have adopted quasi-privatisation mechanisms such as public-
private partnerships (especially in infrastructure development) or utilise private sector agents 
through contract arrangements (such as the provision of employment services at national level). 
 
It is difficult to foresee new public enterprises being established, but if so, the NBN may well 
serve as a model: the basic infrastructure is publicly funded and owned by government but the 
provision of services direct to homes will be subject to market arrangements. This mix of public 
and market-based approaches to infrastructure has attracted a degree of bipartisan support within 
this highly structured industry. However, the greater the revenue stream of new public enterprises, 
the more likely they would become vulnerable to privatisation, unless there were profound 
community service obligations that could not be avoided. 
 
The Productivity Commission (2014, p. 64) has reviewed a number of divestments and 
concluded that “Australia’s experience with privatisation has been mixed…Above all, 
privatisation should be undertaken not for its own sake, but to achieve a more efficient outcome 
for the community at large”. On the matter of efficiency there has been no comprehensive review 
of the efficiency performance of the privatised companies in Australia (Abbott and Cohen, 2014). 
These authors note that “some privatisations have been a clear success. In other cases, however, 
most of the improvements in efficiency took place after corporatisation, rather than following 
privatisation” (Abbott and Cohen, 2014, p.1). The modest impacts of privatisation on efficiency 
are broadly consistent with other studies, such as Florio’s evaluation of British privatisations 
(Florio, 2004). In terms of whether or not privatisation increases overall welfare, again there is 
little robust data. We agree that attempts elsewhere are little more than “crude guesses” and a 
starting point for further research (Florio, 2014). 
 
From the few available studies of post-privatisation performance of entities, it is clear that 
there is little robust evidence to suggest that change of ownership has by itself yielded superior 
performance. This underlines long held views that differences in performance between public and 
private organisations seem to depend less on ownership and more on other factors such as size, 
task, regulatory environment, management skill and technology. Despite this, however, the notion 
persists in some quarters that a change in ownership, public to private, will of itself enhance 
 organisational performance. Simple before-and-after analyses are generally inappropriate as 
regulatory environments typically change with divestment, leaving considerable research 
opportunities for further research in this area.  
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 Table 1: Howard Government Asset Sales (1996-2006) 
 
Date Item Divested Sale Proceeds $m 
July 1996  Commonwealth Bank Secondary Public Share 
Offer (3) and share buy back 
5,100 
December 1996 Commonwealth Funds Management 62.5 
January 1997 Avalon Airport Geelong Ltd 1.5 plus annual lease payments 
May 1997 Phase 1 Airports (Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth)  3,337 
July 1997 DASFLEET 408 
September 1997 Australian Industry Development Corporation Ltd  155 
November 1997 Telstra 1 14,200 plus $3b in retained 
earnings  
November 1997  Australian National Railways Commission 95.4 
October/November 
1997 
Department of Administrative Services (various 
agencies and enterprises) 
28.9 
December 1997 Housing Loans Insurance Corporation 108 
February 1998 Former Macleod Repatriation Hospital Site 1.75 
April 1998 Australian Multimedia Enterprises Ltd 29.3 
April 1998 Phase 2 Airports (Adelaide; Alice Springs; 
Canberra; Coolangatta; Darwin; Hobart; 
Launceston; Mt Isa; Parafield; Tennant Creek; and 
Townsville; Archerfield; Jandakot and 
Moorabbin) 
730.75  
June 1998 Auscript 1.1 
December 1998-May 
1999 
Australian River Co. (Formerly ANL Ltd) 20.697 
March 1999 National Transmission Network 650 
October 1999 Telstra 2 16,000 
November 1999 ADI Ltd 346.78 
January 2000 Removals Australia  10.4 
September 2001 Essendon Airport Ltd 22.044 
February 2002 Combined sale of National Rail Corporation Ltd 
and NSW's Freight Rail Corporation ($1172m 
total transaction value) 
220 
June 2002 Sale of Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport 
($1355m of SACL debt repaid in addition) 
4233  
December 2003 Sale of Sydney Basin Airports (Bankstown, 
Camden and Hoxton Park) 
211.0 
June 2004 ComLand Limited ($25.3m of ComLand debt 
repaid in addition) 
139.7 
Total  46,113 
Note: Figures are not in constant dollar terms 
Sources: DOFA (2004), Fairbrother, Paddon and Teicher (2002), Mayne (2015). 
 
  
 Table 2: Cross Section of Public Enterprises Remaining in Government Ownership 
 
Enterprise  Sector Turnover 
(‘000) 
Employe
es  
Financial Performance 
ABC  Media 
Broadcasting 
$1.07b Federal 
funding 
$157m from 
sales & 
services 
4679 Total fair value measurement of 
assets in statement of financial 
position $915,338m  
Airservices Transport- air 
navigation & 
aviation rescue 
services  
$1,020,839 
 
 
4475 Net profit $21m. 
Return on average equity 3.9% 
Final dividend for 2012-13 of $10m 
paid in Feb 2014. Interim dividend for 
2013-14 of $6m paid in June 2014.  
Future Fund  Sovereign wealth 
fund 
$13,513m  98 Total comprehensive income 
$12,735,894m 
Returns per annum 
3 years = 10.5% 
1 year = 14.3% 
Clean Energy 
Finance 
Corporation  
Energy $41,787 50 CEFC is a not-for-profit entity and, 
working with co-financiers, its object 
is to facilitate increased flows of 
finance into the clean energy sector. 
Approx 7% ROI. 
NBN Co  ICT FY 2013 = 
$16,4 
FY 2014 = 
$61m 
2932 No dividend paid since 2009. 
Revenue increased by $44m over FY 
2013 
 
 
